

EXHIBIT B



U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Southern District of New York

The Silvio J. Mollo Building
One Saint Andrew's Plaza
New York, New York 10007

July 14, 2023

By Email

Seth D. DuCharme
Meagan Maloney
Bracewell LLP
31 West 52nd Street, Suite 1900
New York, NY 10019
Email: seth.ducharme@bracewell.com
Email: meagan.maloney@bracewell.com

Re: *United States v. Charles McGonigal, S1 23 Cr. 16 (JHR)*

Dear Counsel:

On the understandings specified below, the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York (“this Office”) will accept a guilty plea from Charles McGonigal (“the defendant”) to the above-referenced Information.

The sole count of the Information charges the defendant with conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and to commit money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, a maximum term of supervised release of three years, a maximum fine, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3571 of the greatest of \$250,000, twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than the defendant resulting from the offense, and a \$100 mandatory special assessment.

In consideration of the defendant’s plea to the above offense, the defendant will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office (except for criminal tax violations, if any, as to which this Office cannot, and does not, make any agreement) for conspiring to violate and violating IEEPA from in or about the Spring of 2021 through in or about November 2021, and conspiring to launder and laundering the proceeds of that violation of IEEPA, it being understood that this agreement does not bar the use of such conduct as a predicate act or as the basis for a sentencing enhancement in a subsequent prosecution including, but not limited to, a prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 *et seq.* In addition, at the time of sentencing, the Government will move to dismiss any open Count(s) against the defendant. The defendant agrees that with respect to any and all dismissed charges the defendant is not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the “Hyde Amendment,” Section 617, P.L. 105-119 (Nov. 26, 1997), and will not file any claim under that law.

The defendant hereby admits the forfeiture allegation of the Information and agrees to forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461, a sum of money equal to \$17,500 in United States currency, representing proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense alleged in the Information (the “Money Judgment”). It is further understood that any forfeiture of the defendant’s assets shall not be treated as satisfaction of any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty the Court may impose upon him/her in addition to forfeiture. The defendant consents to the entry of the Consent Order of Forfeiture annexed hereto as Exhibit A and agrees that the Consent Order of Forfeiture shall be final as to the defendant at the time it is ordered by the Court.

In consideration of the foregoing and pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) Section 6B1.4, the parties hereby stipulate to the following:

A. Offense Level

1. The November 1, 2021 edition of the Guidelines Manual applies.
2. The applicable guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 is U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a), the base offense level is that from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline. For the substantive offense of violating IEEPA, the applicable guideline is U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1, and for the substantive offense of money laundering, the applicable guideline is U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1.
3. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1(a)(1)(A), the base offense level for violating IEEPA is 26, because national security controls were evaded.
4. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1), the base offense level for money laundering is the offense level for violating IEEPA.
5. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, the base offense level is increased by 2 levels, because the defendant used a special skill in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.
6. Assuming the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through his allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence, a two-level reduction will be warranted, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Furthermore, assuming the defendant has accepted responsibility as described in the previous sentence, the Government will move at sentencing for an additional one-level reduction, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), because the defendant gave timely notice of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the Government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources efficiently.

In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines offense level is 25.

B. Criminal History Category

Based upon the information now available to the Offices (including representations by the defense), the defendant has zero criminal history points.

In accordance with the above, the defendant's Criminal History Category is I.

C. Sentencing Range

Based upon the calculations set forth above, the defendant's sentencing range would be 57 to 71 months' imprisonment, but the applicable range is 57 to 60 months' imprisonment (the "Stipulated Guidelines Range") because the statutory maximum penalty for Count One is 60 months' imprisonment. In addition, after determining the defendant's ability to pay, the Court may impose a fine pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. At Guidelines level 25, the applicable fine range is \$20,000 to \$200,000.

The parties agree that neither a downward nor an upward departure from the Stipulated Guidelines Range set forth above is warranted. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure or adjustment pursuant to the Guidelines that is not set forth herein. Nor will either party in any way suggest that the Probation Office or the Court consider such a departure or adjustment under the Guidelines.

The parties agree that either party may seek a sentence outside of the Stipulated Guidelines Range based upon the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).

Except as provided in any written Proffer Agreement(s) that may have been entered into between this Office and the defendant, nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the parties (i) to present to the Probation Office or the Court any facts relevant to sentencing; (ii) to make any arguments regarding where within the Stipulated Guidelines Range (or such other range as the Court may determine) the defendant should be sentenced and regarding the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a); (iii) to seek an appropriately adjusted Guidelines range if it is determined based upon new information that the defendant's criminal history category is different from that set forth above; and (iv) to seek an appropriately adjusted Guidelines range or mandatory minimum term of imprisonment if it is subsequently determined that the defendant qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, *see* U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, regardless of any stipulation set forth above, if the defendant fails clearly to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through the defendant's allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence. Similarly, nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek an enhancement for obstruction of justice, *see* U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, regardless of any stipulation set forth above, should it be determined that the defendant has either (i) engaged in conduct, unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice or (ii) committed another crime after signing this Agreement.

It is understood that pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d), neither the Probation Office nor the Court is bound by the above Guidelines stipulation, either as to questions of fact or as to the determination of the proper Guidelines to apply to the facts. In the event that the Probation Office or the Court contemplates any Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from those stipulated to above, or contemplates any sentence outside of the stipulated Guidelines range, the parties reserve the right to answer any inquiries and to make all appropriate arguments concerning the same.

It is understood that the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant is determined solely by the Court. It is further understood that the Guidelines are not binding on the Court. The defendant acknowledges that the defendant's entry of a guilty plea to the charged offenses authorizes the sentencing court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence. This Office cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence the defendant will receive. Moreover, it is understood that the defendant will have no right to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty should the sentence imposed by the Court be outside the Guidelines range set forth above.

It is agreed (i) that the defendant will not file a direct appeal; nor bring a collateral challenge, including but not limited to an application under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 and/or Section 2241, of any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 57 to 60 months' imprisonment, and (ii) that the Government will not appeal any sentence within or above the Stipulated Guidelines Range. This provision is binding on the parties even if the Court employs a Guidelines analysis different from that stipulated to herein. Furthermore, it is agreed that any appeal as to the defendant's sentence that is not foreclosed by this provision will be limited to that portion of the sentencing calculation that is inconsistent with (or not addressed by) the above stipulation. The parties agree that this waiver applies regardless of whether the term of imprisonment is imposed to run consecutively to or concurrently with the undischarged portion of any other sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on the defendant at the time of sentencing in this case. The defendant further agrees not to appeal or bring a collateral challenge of any term of supervised release that is less than or equal to the statutory maximum. The defendant also agrees not to appeal or bring a collateral challenge of any fine that is less than or equal to \$200,000, and the Government agrees not to appeal any fine that is greater than or equal to \$20,000. The defendant also agrees not to appeal or bring a collateral challenge of any forfeiture amount that is less than or equal to \$17,500, and the Government agrees not to appeal any forfeiture amount that is greater than or equal to \$17,500. The defendant also agrees not to appeal or bring a collateral challenge to any special assessment that is less than or equal to \$100. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to be a waiver of whatever rights the defendant may have to assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether on direct appeal, collateral review, or otherwise. Rather, it is expressly agreed that the defendant reserves those rights.

By entering this plea of guilty, the defendant waives any and all right to withdraw the defendant's plea or to attack the defendant's conviction or sentence, either on direct appeal or collaterally, on the ground that the Government has failed to produce any discovery material (other than information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant), including *Jencks* Act material, material pursuant to *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and impeachment material

pursuant to *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that has not already been produced as of the date of the signing of this Agreement.

The defendant recognizes that, if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, the defendant's guilty plea and conviction make it very likely that the defendant's removal from the United States is presumptively mandatory and that, at a minimum, the defendant is at risk of being removed or suffering other adverse immigration consequences. If the defendant is a naturalized citizen of the United States, the defendant recognizes that pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to the defendant's immigration status. Under federal law, an individual may be subject to denaturalization and removal if the defendant's naturalization was procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, or otherwise illegally procured. The defendant acknowledges that the defendant has discussed the possible immigration consequences (including removal or denaturalization) of the defendant's guilty plea and conviction with defense counsel. The defendant affirms that the defendant wants to plead guilty regardless of any immigration or denaturalization consequences that may result from the guilty plea and conviction, even if those consequences include denaturalization and/or removal from the United States. The defendant understands that denaturalization and other immigration consequences are typically the subject of a separate proceeding, and the defendant understands that no one, including the defendant's attorney or the District Court, can predict with certainty the effect of the defendant's conviction on the defendant's immigration or naturalization status. It is agreed that the defendant will have no right to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea based on any actual or perceived adverse immigration consequences (including removal or denaturalization) resulting from the guilty plea and conviction. It is further agreed that the defendant will not challenge the defendant's conviction or sentence on direct appeal, or through litigation under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 and/or Section 2241, on the basis of any actual or perceived adverse immigration consequences (including removal or denaturalization) resulting from the defendant's guilty plea and conviction.

It is further agreed that should the conviction(s) following the defendant's plea(s) of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, then any prosecution that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against the defendant, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

It is further understood that this Agreement does not bind any federal, state, or local prosecuting authority other than this Office.

Apart from any written Proffer Agreement(s) that may have been entered into between this Office and defendant, this Agreement supersedes any prior understandings, promises, or conditions between this Office and the defendant. No additional understandings, promises, or conditions have been entered into other than those set forth in this Agreement, and none will be entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

Very truly yours,

DAMIAN WILLIAMS
United States Attorney

By:


Hagan Scotten / Rebecca T. Dell /
Derek Wikstrom
Assistant United States Attorneys
(212) 637-2410 / 2198 / 1085

APPROVED:


Rebekah Donaleski
Co-Chief, Public Corruption Unit

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:

Charles McGonigal
Defendant

DATE

APPROVED:

Seth D. DuCharme
Meagan Maloney
Attorneys for Charles McGonigal

DATE